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Dolan v. City of Tigard:

CONDITIONAL LAND
USE PERMITS
REQUIRING
DEDICATION MUST
MEET TWO
PRONG TEST OF
ESSENTIAL NEXUS
AND ROUGH
PROPORTIONALITY
OR REQUIRES
COMPENSATION
UNDER FIFTH
AMENDMENT.
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In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme
Court in Dolan v. City oJTigard,
114 S. Ct 2309 (1994), held
that in addition to the showing
of an essential nexus between a
land use permit and a legitimate
state interest, there must also be
a "rough proportionality" between the permit condition and
projected impact ofthe land use.
The ruling signaled the Court's
unwillingness to ignore the guarantees secured by the Fifth
Amendmenttothe United States
Constitution in an era of increasing land use regulatory
schemes.
The action originated
when Florence Dolan applied
for a permit to double the size of
her plumbing supply store. The
City Planning Commission
("The Commission") granted
the permit subject to its Community Development Code
("CDC") which required, inter
alia, that Dolan dedicate a portion of her property, which lay
in a floodplain, for a flood control greenway and a pedestrian!
bike trail. The area in question
approximated roughly ten percent ofDolan's property, which
she could rely upon to meet the
fifteen percent open space and
landscaping requirement mandated by the City's zoning
scheme.
Dolan applied for, and
was refused, a variance from the
CDC conditions. The Commission found that the larger facility would create more traffic in
the area and that a pedestrian!
bike trail could offset some of
the congestion. The Commis-
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sion further found that since the
intensified development would
also increase stormwater runoff
into a nearby stream already
strained by other sources of
drainage, the dedication requirement was sufficiently related to
Dolan's plans to further develop
the site.
Dolan appealed to the
Land Use Board of Appeals
("L UBA") on the grounds that
the City's dedication requirement was not reasonably related to her proposed development and constituted a Fifth
Amendment taking. However,
LUBA found a reasonable relationship between the proposed
development and both the pedestrianlbike trail and greenway.
The Oregon Court of Appeals
affirmed, finding that the permit
conditions were reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of Dolan's business. The
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Court began by noting that the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires states to compensate landowners when their
land is appropriated for public
use for the sole reason that government should not be able to
force some people to bear burdens, which, in all fairness,
should be borne by the public as
a whole. Id at 2316 (citing
Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40 (1960)). However,
the Court acknowledged that
government could hardly go on
ifdiminution ofproperty values
incident to a change in the law
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required compensation, (citing
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1926)),
and a land use regulation does
not effect a taking if it '''substantially advances a state interest' and does not 'deny an owner
economically viable use of his
land. ,,, Dolan at 2316 (quoting
Aginsv. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980)). Simply put, in order for a government to condition a permit on the dedication
of land to the state, there first
must be an essential nexus between the legitimate state interest and permit condition. ld. at
2317. (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987)). If no such relationship exists, "under the wellsettled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' agovernment
may not require a person to give
up a constitutional right--here
the right to be compensated--in
exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government. ... " ld. Notably, the
Court agreed with those below
thatthe necessary nexus existed
between the dedication requirement and the legitimate state
interest in flood prevention and
traffic reduction. ld.
Turning to the question
left open in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm 'n, the Court
pointed out that in addition to
determining whether the essential nexus requirement was met,
it was further necessary to ascertain whether the permit condition bore the necessary relationshipto the impact of Dolan's
proposed expansion project.
Dolan at 2317-18 . Noting that

a use restriction may constitute
a taking ifnot reasonably necessary to the accomplishment ofa
substantial governmental purpose, the Court pointed out that
both the City's and the
Commission'sfindingswerenothing but conclusory statements
and, without more, insufficient
to support a dedication requirement in a city zoning permit. ld.
at 2318.
After rejecting state
court decisions which required
only generalized statements of
connection or very exacting
causal analysis, the Court felt
that a rough proportionality
should exist between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed development. ld. at 2318-20. Turning
to the facts before it, the majority noted that the City's zoning
requirement already required
Dolan's property to remain fifteen percent undeveloped and
could not understand how a public greenway could better prevent flooding than a private one.
ld. at 2320. Of course, as to
Dolan, her inability to exclude
others meant aloss of one of the
most fundamental of property
rights. ld. (citing Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979». Further, the City
only indicated that the bike/pedestrian trail could offset traffic
conditions due to the expansion,
not that it would, and made little
effortto quantify its conclusion(s).
ld. at 2321-22 (emphasis added).
In sum, the Court concluded
that while "[n]o mathematical
calculation is required . . . the
city must make some sort of

individualized determination
that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed
development." ld. at 2319-20.
However laudable land use planning may be, the constitutional
guarantee ofcompensation cannot be short-circuited. ld. at
2322.
Ina spirited dissent, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg
joined, criticized the majority
for going beyond the essential
nexus requirement established
in Nollan and found the Court's
rough proportionality requirement "remarkably inventive."
Id. at2323. Further, the dissent
noted that previous takings cases
focused on the entire parcel in
question and not merely the
portion subject to the taking
and that the right to exclude
others is merel y one ofa number
of rights associated with property. ld. at 2324-25, 2329.
The dissent further split
from the majority by pointing
out that the ruling seriously departs from the "traditional presumption of constitutionality"
when states act pursuant to their
police powers by "imposing a
novel burden of proof on a city
implementing an admittedly
valid comprehensive land use
plan." ld. at 2326. Under the
guise of substantive due process, Justice Stevens expressed
concern that the majority was
attempting to reassert a
superlegislative power not seen
since the Lochner era. ld. at
2329.
Ina lone dissent, Justice
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Souter asserted that the Court
applied a test no different than
that announced in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'no Dolan.
at 2330. Rather than showing
any lack of proportionality between the permit condition and
adverse effect, Justice Souter
opined that the Court simply
found a lack of any rational connection between the public
greenway and flood control, and
believed this to be nothing more
than the "essential nexus test"
announced in Nollan. Id.

A victory for property
rights advocates, Dolan V. City
of Tigard assures landowners
that they alone will not have to
bear the burden of comprehensive land use schemes. While
the public has a strong interest
in obtaining sensitive lands to
protect the environment and
provide forrecreation, the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution require compensation be
paid for lands acquired for public use. Acknowledging the
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pervasiveness of land use regulation in Maryland, Dolan will,
in all likelihood, result in an
increase in litigation and force
local governments to make individual determinations with
regard to landowners saddled
with potentially unfair permit
conditions.
- Robert Schulte
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